We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n. Our main result states that for n-player binary-action games and for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n. As a consequence of this result, we get an exponential lower bound on the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics to approximate Nash equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept in game theory. The complexity of Nash equilibrium is an active area of research for the past few decades. The complexity of Nash equilibrium is not only relevant from a theoretical standpoint but also important in game theory, economics, biology, and other fields that use Nash equilibrium as a prediction of behavior. If Nash equilibrium is a complex notion, then it raises doubts whether this is a good prediction of behavior, simply because humans (or machines) are unlikely to compute an equilibrium and act accordingly.
It is known that the problem of computing exact Nash equilibrium is computationally hard (see Daskalakis et al. [2009] ), even for two-player games (see Chen et al. [2009] ). However, in many contexts, an approximate Nash equilibrium (see Definitions 2.2 and 2.3) is almost as reasonable a solution concept as exact Nash equilibrium. Unlike the exact Nash equilibrium, which is known to be a complex notion, there are many open questions regarding the complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium. In this article, we focus on one of them. Given a normal-form n-player game with a constant number of actions m for each player, how hard is it to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium? Note that in this problem the size of the input is exponential. A reasonable model to consider in such a case is the query model. 1 Instead of a huge input that specifies the whole game, we assume the existence of a black box. The algorithm can submit action profiles (see Section 3.1) or distributions over action profiles (see Section 3.2) as queries to the black box. For each query, the black box returns the associated payoffs of the game. We measure the complexity of an algorithm by the (expected) number of queries that it asks in the worst case. The notion of query complexity captures the amount of information that is required for computing an approximate equilibrium.
Before stating our main result on the query complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium, we mention the query complexity characterization for the related solution concept of approximate correlated equilibrium. There exists a randomized algorithm for computing an approximate correlated equilibrium using only poly(n) payoff queries. Such a surprising 2 result is achieved by regret minimizing algorithms (see Hart and Nisan [2013] , Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] , Hart [2005] , and Foster and Vohra [1999] ). One might hope that an analogous randomized algorithm will exist for approximate Nash equilibrium. In this article, we exclude such a possibility by showing an exponential lower bound for the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium (see Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, and 3.6).
We discuss two notions of additive approximate equilibrium: approximate Nash equilibrium and approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium (see Section 2.2 for definitions and a short discussion on these two notions). Our main result (Theorem 3.2) states that even when the approximation term is a fixed constant, the query complexity of an approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games is 2 (n) . The proof of the result is based on a novel reduction from the problem of finding a fixed point of a function to the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium. The connection between the hardness of computing Nash equilibria and the hardness of computing fixed points was known from prior work (see Daskalakis et al. [2009] and Chen et al. [2009] ). However, the established reductions fail to work for an approximate Nash equilibrium when the approximation term is constant. Beyond the simplicity of our reduction (see Section 4.1.1), to the best of our knowledge this is the first reduction that works for an approximate notion of Nash equilibrium (the approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium) with a constant value of the approximation term.
The exponential lower bound on the query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria has several applications and consequences.
1. In terms of computational complexity, this result provides evidence that it is very unlikely that there exists a polynomial (in n) algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games. This is because if such an algorithm exists, then it must depend on more complex data of the game rather than just expected payoffs under distributions. Note that such an algorithm exists for the related problem of computing an approximate or even an exact correlated equilibrium (see Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2011] and Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] ).
2. The result provides insights into the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics to an approximate Nash equilibrium (see Section 3.5). The question of the convergence of adaptive dynamics to an exact Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed) was studied by Hart and Mansour [2010] , where they provide exponential lower bounds via
Related Literature
In a recent paper, Hart and Nisan [2013] study the query complexity of correlated equilibria in n-player games with a constant number of actions m (as we do in this article for Nash equilibria). They show an exp(n) lower bound in the following cases:
-Computation of an exact correlated equilibrium using randomized algorithms -Computation of an approximate correlated equilibrium using deterministic algorithms Since (approximate) Nash equilibria are a subset of (approximate) correlated equilibria, these results imply an exponential lower bound also for the computation of Nash equilibria. Note that these results leave open the query complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium for randomized algorithms, which is also posed in Hart and Nisan [2013] as an open problem. In this article, we address exactly this question and prove an exp(n) lower bound.
In addition to the aforementioned literature, there are a few other more recent papers that study the query complexity of equilibria and fixed points. Fearnley and Savani [2014] and Fearnley et al. [2013] study the query complexity of an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. Fearnley et al. [2013] also provide several classes of n-player games where a polynomial number of queries is sufficient to find an approximate Nash equilibrium. The negative result of this article shows that unlike the aforementioned games, in general games an exponential number of queries are needed. Goldberg and Roth [2014] study the query complexity of several notions of approximate equilibria. In particular, they prove that for games with succinct representation, the query complexity of an approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium is polynomial in the number of players, the number of actions for each player, and the representation size. This result demonstrates that the exponential lower bound presented in the present article cannot hold for succinctly representable games. We point out that the query algorithm of Goldberg and Roth [2014] for computing an approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium is not computationally efficient. Moreover, in a recent paper, Rubinstein [2014a] proves that computing an approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard for succinctly representable games with n players and a constant number of actions. His proof is based on our novel reduction (Section 4.1.1) from the fixed-point problem to the approximate Nash equilibrium problem, which holds for constant ε. In an even more recent paper, Rubinstein [2014b] proves that this PPAD-hardness result actually holds for a very simple class of succinctly representable games: graphical polymatrix games.
The query complexity of fixed points has been studied in two different settings. In the first scenario, the value of approximation of the fixed point is constant, but the dimension (of the domain and image) is large. This is the case that is considered in this article. In the second scenario, the dimension is a fixed constant, but the value of the approximation of the fixed point is low. Both cases are considered in the classical paper by Hirsch et al. [1989] . The second scenario has been further studied in more recent papers. Chen and Deng [2008] improve the upper and lower bounds of Hirsch et al. [1989] and actually provide a tight bound on the deterministic query complexity of fixed points in the second scenario. Chen and Teng [2007] prove a randomized lower bound for a fixed-point problem that matches the deterministic upper bound of Hirsch et al. [1989] and Chen and Deng [2008] . Namely, Chen and Teng [2007] prove that randomization is not helpful in fixed-point computation for the second scenario. In Corollary 3.7 and Theorem 3.8, we prove a similar result for the first scenario. Finally, provide a quantum query complexity lower bound for fixed-point computation, again for the second scenario.
PRELIMINARIES

The Query Model
In the query model, every problem is specified by possible inputs, desired outputs, and queries. The queries are specified by the types of questions that can be asked and by the answers that are provided. A query algorithm, which in this article will be called simply algorithm, is a procedure that asks queries in an adaptive manner and essentially for every input generates an output. Note that we put no computational constraints on the way the algorithm generates the next query or the output, given the previous answers.
For randomized algorithms, we allow errors in the output. Namely, we require that for all inputs, the answer will be correct only with probability p < 1.
Given an input, the number of queries of a randomized algorithm is a random variable. There are two reasonable definitions for the query complexity of a randomized algorithm. One definition is via expectation, namely, the expected number of queries for outputting the correct answer with probability p, which is denoted by QC E, p ( ). Another definition restricts the number of queries to be at most T , and we ask what is the minimal number T such that there exists an algorithm that outputs the correct answer with probability p. We denote this number of queries by QC p ( ). There is a close relation between these two definitions. One such relation is given in the following remark.
Remark 2.1. Note that QC p ( ) ≤ 2QC E,2 p ( ), because for an algorithm with expected query complexity q that outputs the correct answer with probability 2 p, we can run the algorithm for at most 2q queries. By the Markov inequality, the algorithm will terminate within these 2q queries with probability of at least 1 2 . If it terminates, then the answer is correct with probability 2 p. Therefore, the output is correct with probability of at least 1 2 (2 p) = p.
The results in the present article are lower bounds. We will formulate the results using QC p . By the previous remark, we can easily translate all these lower bounds on QC p into lower bounds on QC E,2 p .
Normal-Form Games
We consider normal-form n-player games where every player has m actions, and the payoffs are in [0, 1]. In the case where m = 2, we call the game a binary-action game. We use the standard notations. The set of players is [n]. The set of actions of player i is A i . The set of action profiles is A = × i A i . The payoff function of player i is u i : A → [0, 1]. The set of mixed strategies of player i is denoted by (A i ). For a mixed strategy x i ∈ (A i ), we denote by supp(x i ) ⊂ A i the set of strategies that are played with positive probability. The set of distributions over action profiles is denoted by (A). The payoff function u i can be multilinearly extended into u i : (A) → [0, 1]. The payoff profile is denoted by u = (u i ) n i=1 , and we will identify the game with u. Given a profile of mixed actions x = (x i ) n i=1 , where x i ∈ (A i ), we denote by br i (x) = max a i ∈A i u i (a i , x −i ) the best-reply value of player i, that is, the maximal payoff that player i can get against opponents' strategy x −i .
There are two different notions for an additive approximation for Nash equilibrium. The more common notion is defined as follows.
Namely, the mixed strategy of a player leads to a high enough payoff. The second notion, which is not less intuitive, is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3. A mixed-action profile x is an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium (ε-WSNE for short) if for every player i and every action a i ∈ supp(
Namely, each action that a player plays leads to a high enough payoff. Note that every ε-WSNE is an ε-NE, but not vice versa. Nevertheless, we can construct an approximate WSNE from an approximate NE by relaxing the approximation term from ε to ( √ εn). Such a construction appears in Daskalakis et al. [2009] , Lemma 4.28, and a variation of this construction appears in our proof of Theorem 3.6 in Appendix A.
Our main focus in this article will be on approximate well-supported Nash equilibria. But, by the aforementioned construction, it will induce results on approximate Nash equilibria as well (see Theorem 3.6).
THE RESULTS
The Main Results
Consider the problem of an approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium.
WSN(n, m, ε):
INPUT: n-player game u where every player has m actions and the payoffs are in [0, 1].
OUTPUT: An ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium. QUERIES: Each query is a pure action profile a and the answer is the payoff profile u(a).
We show in Theorem 3.2 that even for the case of m = 2 and constant ε, the problem WSN requires 2 (n) queries. Before that, we introduce in Theorem 3.1 a slightly weaker result: for constant m and constant ε, the problem WSN requires 2 (n) queries. The reasons for including the weaker result are as follows: First, the proof of the stronger result (for the case of m = 2) is based on the proof of the weaker result (for the case of constant m), which is cleaner and simpler for understanding. Second, the lower bound for the case of constant m is 2 n/6 (if we ignore polynomial factors), whereas the lower bound for the case of m = 2 is 2 n/22170 . Namely, the lower bound for the case of constant m is significantly better (although both of them are exponential).
Constant Number of Actions for Each Player.
THEOREM 3.1. Fix m = 3,609 and ε = 1 2 10 −7 . For every randomized algorithm that uses 16 · 2 n/6 /n 4 pure-action queries to compute an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium in n-player games with m actions for all players, there exists a game where it returns a correct answer with probability of at most 3 · 2 −n/6 . That is, QC p (WSN(n, m, ε)) ≥ 16 2 n 6 n 4 = 2 (n) for p = 3 · 2 −n/6 . This theorem is in contrast to the correlated equilibrium case, where the regretminimizing algorithms (see, e.g., Littlestone and Warmuth [1994] , Foster and Vohra [1999] , and Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] ) require only a polynomial number of queries to find an approximate correlated equilibrium.
The complete proof of Theorem 3.1 appears in Section 4. We present here a brief outline of the proof.
Outline of the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof is done in three steps.
In the first step (Section 4.1.1), we reduce the problem of finding approximated WSNE in a 2n-player game to the problem of finding an approximate fixed point of a Lipschitz continuous n-dimensional mapping. For every function f , we define a game u = u( f ) (see Equations (1) and (2)), such that every approximate WSNE of u( f ) corresponds to an approximate fixed point of f . The motivation for the reduction comes from a proof of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem using Nash's theorem, which appears in a blog by Shmaya [2012] . 3 In the second step (Section 4.2), we introduce the reduction of Hirsch et al. [1989] from the problem of finding an approximate fixed point of an n-dimensional mapping to the problem of finding the end of a simple path (i.e., path with no cycles) on the n-dimensional hypercube. For every simple path α, they construct a mapping f = f (α) such that every approximate fixed point of f corresponds to the end of the path α (see properties (P1)-(P3) in Remark 4.3).
Finally, in the third step (Section 4.3), we prove that the end of a simple path is a hard problem, even in randomized settings. Hart and Nisan [2013] show that the end of a path (not necessarily a simple one) is a hard problem. Using similar arguments to those in Hart and Nisan [2013] , we strengthen this hardness result: it is hard to find the end of a path, even if it is known that the path is simple.
3.1.2. Binary-Action Games. Theorem 3.1 proves an exponential lower bound on the number of queries that are required for finding an approximate WSNE for games with a constant (m = 3,609), but huge, number of actions for each player. Our second main theorem states that an exponential lower bound holds even for the case where each player has only two actions (m = 2). THEOREM 3.2. There exist constants 4 c 1 , c 2 , ε > 0 such that for p = 2 −c 1 n = 2 − (n) holds QC p (WSN(n, 2, ε)) ≥ 2 c 2 n = 2 (n) .
3 Similar ideas appear also in Kakade and Foster [2004] and Hazan and Kakade [2012] in the context of calibration. 4 We prove the result for the constants c 1 = c 2 = 1 22170 and ε = 1 14·10 6 .
The proof is relegated to Section 4. The idea is to modify the reduction from the approximate fixed-point problem to approximate WSNE that appears in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We introduce a version of this reduction that holds for binary-action games. Roughly speaking, the idea is to replace a player with m actions by m different agents, where each agent has only two actions. The specific structure of the payoffs in the reduction of Theorem 3.1 allows us to do so, without changing the property that every approximate WSNE of the constructed game corresponds to an approximate fixed point of the function.
Remark 3.3. In the remainder of the article, we will state all the consequences from the main theorems for binary-action games rather than for games with a constant number of actions, simply because this result is theoretically stronger.
All the consequences can be stated also for the case of a constant number of actions (more precisely, for games with 3,609 actions for each player), and then the constant at the exponent of the lower bound is significantly better ( 1 6 instead of 1 22170 ). Remark 3.4. For ease of presentation, in the remainder of the article, we will not explicitly mention the exact constants in the theorem statements. Our results are essentially asymptotic in nature. The exact constants that follow from our proofs are poor (e.g., we prove a lower bound of 2 cn for a very small value of c). Improving the underlying constants remains an open question.
Distribution Queries
In Theorem 3.2, we considered the model where each query is a pure action profile a ∈ A in the game. We would like to generalize the exponential lower bound of Theorem 3.2 to the case where each query can be a distribution over action profiles x ∈ (A).
The most natural model that comes to mind is the one where the answer to the query x is the exact value u(x). This model is not so interesting. In this model, one query is enough to receive the complete information about all the payoffs in the game, for games where payoffs are integer multiplications of 1/M, for some integer M. We illustrate this fact in the case where all payoffs are 0 or 1 (i.e., M = 1).
We numerate all the action profiles in the game by A = {a(0), a(1), . . . , a(N − 1)}, where N = m n , and we query the distribution x with
From the answer
the algorithm can derive all the values u(a( j)).
This idea can be easily generalized from the 0, 1-payoffs case to the case where all payoffs are from the set {k/M : 0 ≤ k ≤ M, k ∈ N} for every M.
The exact-answer model mentioned earlier is not so interesting because the answer u(x) may contain a huge amount of information, as illustrated in the previous example.
A reasonable way to overcome this issue is to assume that the answers are given with precision δ. Namely, for every query x ∈ (A), the answer is some vector w ∈ R n , where ||w − u(x)|| ∞ < δ. In this model, we consider the problem of approximate WSNE.
WSN dist (n, m, ε, δ): INPUT: n-player game u where every player has m actions and the payoffs are in [0, 1].
OUTPUT: An ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
QUERIES: Each query is a distribution over actions x ∈ (A) and the answer is some payoff vector w where ||w − u(x)|| ∞ ≤ δ.
We will say that an algorithm solves the problem WSN dist in T queries (x t ) T t=1 if it outputs the correct answer for every sequence of answers
For every distribution query x, the answer u(x) can be well approximated by a long enough sequence of pure action queries, simply by sampling from the distribution x in an i.i.d. manner (see Lipton et al. [2003] ). Hence, the impossibility result of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 yields an impossibility result also for the distribution model. THEOREM 3.5. For constant ε and for p = 2 − (n) holds
Theorem 3.5 yields that even for answers that are given with exponentially small precision (i.e., δ = 2 − (n) ), the exponential lower bound still holds.
Theorem 3.5 emphasizes even more the difference from the correlated equilibrium case. Following Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2011] , an exact correlated equilibrium can be computed using a polynomial number of distribution queries (see also Babichenko and Barman [2013] ). By Theorem 3.5, then, not only an exact Nash equilibrium but also an approximate Nash equilibrium cannot be computed. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.5. Every WSN dist algorithm that uses δ 2 2 cn /n distribution queries with success probability p + δ 2 2 (c−2)n induces a WSN algorithm with 2 cn queries with success probability p. We replace every distribution query x by n/δ 2 pure action queries that are sampled i.i.d. from x. By Hoeffding's inequality (see Hoeffding [1963] ), the probability that the sample approximates u i (x) with a precision of δ is at least 1 − 2e −2n > 1 − 2 −2n . Therefore, the probability that all the δ 2 2 cn /n queries will be well approximated for all players is at least 1 − δ 2 2 cn 2 −2n = 1 − δ 2 2 (c−2)n .
By Theorem 3.2, for constant c < 2 and p = 2 − (n) , there is no WSN algorithm with 2 cn queries with success probability p. This implies that for every algorithm that uses δ 2 2 cn /n = δ 2 2 (n) distribution queries, the probability of success is at most p + δ 2 2 (c−2)n = 2 − (n) .
Approximate Nash Equilibrium
The approximate (not necessarily well-supported) Nash equilibrium problem is denoted by ANE. ANE has the same input and the same queries as the WSN problem. The desired output is an ε-Nash equilibrium. For the approximate Nash equilibrium case, Theorem 3.1 induces the following result. THEOREM 3.6. QC p (ANE(n, 2, 1 n )) ≥ 2 (n) for p = 2 − (n) . This theorem excludes the possibility of a subexponential full approximation scheme for the Nash equilibrium in the query model.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 3.6 is simple and is presented next. The formal proof is slightly technical and it is relegated to the appendix.
Outline of the proof of Theorem 3.6. The idea is that we can construct O(ε)-
Once we prove this, the lower bound QC p (ANE(n, 2, ε 2 n )) ≥ 2 (n) follows immediately from Theorem 3.2. Daskalakis et al. [2009] , Lemma 4.28, present such a construction. For every player i, let a * i be one of the best replies to x −i , and let br i = u i (a * i , x −i ) be the best-reply value. Fix the threshold t i = br i − ε. In the mixed strategy y i , every probability mass on an action a i such that u i (a i , x −i ) < t i is replaced by a probability mass on the action a * i .
We cannot use this construction directly, because in the pure-action queries model, the values u i (a i , x −i ) are not known to the algorithm. Nevertheless, we can use approximations to those values through sampling (similar to Theorem 3.5). In the proof of the theorem, we show that the previous construction can be done even if we use approximate values for u i (a i , x −i ) rather than exact ones.
The Approximate Fixed-Point Problem
We will consider the || · || ∞ norm on R n . Thus, a function f :
The approximate fixed-point problem is defined as follows.
AFP (n, λ, ε) :
The query complexity of the approximate fixed-point problem was studied by Hirsch et al. [1989] in deterministic settings. 5 As was mentioned earlier, in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we reduce the problem of an approximate WSNE to the problem of an approximate fixed point. Then we prove that the approximate fixed-point problem requires an exponential number of queries, even if we allow randomized algorithms. This result generalizes the result in Hirsch et al. [1989] to randomized algorithms, and may be of independent interest. COROLLARY 3.7. Fix λ = 79 and ε = 1/88; then for p = 2 − (n) holds
Moreover, in randomized settings (unlike deterministic settings), we can use the sampling method to derive lower bounds for the case where the queries are distributions. This observation answers the open question that was presented in Hirsch et al. [1989] : what is the query complexity of finding an approximate fixed point of a function f : [0, 1] n → [0, 1] n when every query is a distribution over [0, 1] n ?
Note that exactly as in the Nash equilibrium case (see the beginning of Section 3.2), the case where the answer to a distribution μ is the exact value E x∼μ f (x) is not interesting. By similar arguments to those that appear at the beginning of Section 3.2, we can use only one query to get the values of f on an arbitrary small grid, if we know that the values of the function on this grid are rational numbers with a denominator at most M. This is indeed the case, for instance, if the function is rational (a quotient of two polynomials). Therefore, as in Section 3.2, we analyze the problem when the answers are given with a precision δ.
AFP dist (n, λ, ε, δ):
OUTPUT: An ε-fixed point of f . QUERIES: Each query is a distribution μ over [0, 1] n and the answer is some vector
THEOREM 3.8. Fix λ = 79 and ε = 1/88; then for p = 2 − (n) holds QC p (AFP dist (n, λ, ε, δ)) ≥ δ 2 2 (n) .
Note that even if the answers are given with an exponentially small precision (δ = 2 − (n) ), the exponential lower bound still holds.
The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 3.5: we can implement every AFP dist algorithm by an AFP algorithm using the sampling method.
Adaptive Dynamics
One of the central tools to derive lower bounds on the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics is the communication complexity tool (see Kushilevitz and Nisan [1997] ). Conitzer and Sandholm [2004] first introduced this idea in their study of two-player games. Later, Hart and Mansour [2010] studied the communication complexity of Nash equilibria in n-player games. Hart and Mansour [2010] showed that the communication complexity of exact pure and mixed Nash equilibria is exponential in n. As a consequence, they derived that there exists no uncoupled dynamic (see Hart and Mas-Colell [2003, 2005] for definition and discussion on uncoupled dynamics) that converges to a pure or an exact mixed Nash equilibrium faster than 2 (n) steps (for constant c). The question regarding the communication complexity of and the rate of convergence to an approximate Nash equilibrium, however, remained an open question.
Here we will not address the question of the communication complexity of an approximate Nash equilibrium. The query complexity model is weaker than the communication complexity model. Nevertheless, our result on the query complexity does induce interesting insights into the rate of convergence to an approximate Nash equilibrium of adaptive dynamics.
The communication complexity model induces results on the important class of uncoupled dynamics. The query complexity model induces results on a different class of dynamics, which we will call k-queries dynamics. As we will see, this class of dynamics contains most of the known adaptive dynamics.
3.5.1. Dynamics Model and k-Queries Dynamics. We introduce a very brief description of the dynamic model.
In the dynamic settings, we assume that the same one-shot game u is played repeatedly over time t = 1, 2, . . . . A history of play at time t is the sequence h(t) = (a(1), a(2), . . . , a(t − 1)) of past realized action profiles. For general dynamics, the mixed action of every player i at time t depends on the game u and on the history of play at time t, and will be denoted by x i (t) = s i (u, h(t) ). The realized pure action profile a(t) is drawn according to the mixed-action profile (x i (t)) i∈ [n] . The dynamic is specified by the mappings (s i ) i∈ [n] , where s i maps every payoff function and history of play to player's i next mixed action.
The idea in the definition of k-queries dynamics is to ask: How many additional payoff queries are needed to calculate the mixed strategies x i (t) = s i (u, h t ) of all players i ∈ [n] at time t? By "additional" we mean "additional to the queries that were already asked until time t − 1."
Let as illustrate this idea by an example.
Example 3.9. Consider the class of regret-based dynamics, that is, dynamics where at each time t, the mixed action of every player i is a function of the regrets {R i a i →a i : a i , a i ∈ A i }, where the regrets are calculated according to the aggregate joint action of the opponents until time t. See Hart [2005] for the definition of regrets and a discussion on regret-based dynamics. Note that all the regrets of player i at time t depend only on the payoffs {u i (a i , a(t ) −i ) : a i ∈ A i , t < t}. Therefore, in order to calculate the regrets of player i, it is sufficient at each time t to query the mactions {(a i , a(t−1) −i ) : a i ∈ A i } (note that the actions {(a i , a(t ) −i ) : a i ∈ A i , t < t − 1} were already queried in the previous steps). Hence, we will say that regret-based dynamics are nm-queries dynamics, because nm additional payoff queries at each step are sufficient to calculate the mixed strategy of all players.
The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 3.10. A dynamic will be called the k-queries dynamic if there exists a mapping that assigns to each history of play a set of k (additional) pure action payoff queries, such that the mixed strategy of all players at time t can be calculated using the tk queries until time t.
3.5.2. The Generality of k-Queries Dynamics. We argue that most-studied adaptive dynamics are mn-queries dynamics.
Example 3.9 illustrates the fact that regret-based dynamics are mn-queries dynamics. The arguments in the example can be applied not only to the regret matching dynamic but also to many of the other studied regret-minimizing dynamics as eigenvector dynamics, smooth fictitious play, and joint strategy fictitious play (an overview of regret-minimizing dynamics appears in Hart [2005] ).
Better reply dynamics are also mn-queries dynamics, because the mixed action of every player i at time t depends on the set of payoffs {u i (a i , a(t − 1)) : a i ∈ A i }, which again requires mn queries. The class of better reply dynamics includes important dynamics as best-reply dynamics and logit dynamics (see Blume [1993] ).
Another class of dynamics that was studied in the literature is evolutionary dynamics, such as replicator dynamics and smith dynamics (an overview of evolutionary dynamics appears in Sandholm [2010] ). Evolutionary dynamics in population games are a specific case of better-reply dynamics, and therefore they are also mn-queries dynamics.
3.5.3. Lower Bound on the Rate of Convergence. Clearly every k-queries dynamic that converges to an approximate equilibrium (or any other solution concept of the game) in T steps with probability p induces a query algorithm in the pure-query model that finds an approximate equilibrium in at most kT queries with probability p.
Therefore, from Theorem 3.2, we get the following corollary regarding the rate of convergence of k-queries dynamics: COROLLARY 3.11. There exists a constant ε such that no k-queries dynamic converges to an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium in 2 (n) /k steps with probability more than 2 − (n) in all n-player binary-action games.
By the Minmax Theorem (which is also called in this context Yao's Minmax Theorem), the impossibility result can also be extended to the Bayesian settings, where the game is drawn according to a probability distribution. COROLLARY 3.12. There exists a constant ε and a distribution over n-players binaryactions games, such that for every k-queries dynamic the expected 6 number of steps until the dynamic converges to an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is at least 2 (n) /k. Corollary 3.12 states that there exists a distribution over games that is universally bad for all dynamics, whereas Corollary 3.11 states that for every dynamic there exists some bad instances.
The lower bound of Theorem 3.6 induces a lower bound on the rate of convergence of k-queries dynamics to approximate Nash equilibrium (rather than approximate wellsupported Nash equilibrium). COROLLARY 3.13. There is no k-queries dynamic that converges to a 1 n -Nash equilibrium in 2 (n) /k steps with probability more than 2 − (n) in all n-player binary action games.
There are important dynamics, such as the fictitious-play dynamic (see Robinson [1951] ), where in order to calculate the mixed action of the player using a small number of queries, we must use mixed-action queries, rather than pure. In fictitious play, for example, the strategy of every player i at time t is determined by the payoffs {u i (a i , (g j ) j =i ) : a i ∈ A i }, where g j is the aggregate behavior of player j up to time t. For those dynamics we can similarly define k-mixed-queries dynamics, or a more general class of k-distribution-queries dynamics. In order to derive a lower bound on the rate of convergence of those dynamics, we should rely on the impossibility result of Theorem 3.5, which corresponds to the case where the queries could be mixed actions, or more general-distributions over action profiles. A difficulty arises when we try to do so. The query model in Theorem 3.5 assumes that the answers are given with a precision δ, whereas in the dynamics model the answers are precise. An additional assumption of the continuity of the dynamic (see Definition B.2) makes it possible to derive a query algorithm with approximate answers using a dynamic that depends on the exact answers. The formal discussion on distribution-queries dynamics and the lower bound on the rate of convergence of continuous k-distribution-queries dynamics (see Theorem B.3) are relegated to Appendix B. WSN(2n, k + 1, 3 4k 2 ) problem, where k = λ+3 2ε (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3 for the definitions of the problems). The intuition for our reduction comes from a proof of Brower's fixed-point theorem using Nash's theorem (see a blog of Shmaya [2012] ).
Given a λ-Lipschitz function f : [0, 1] n → [0, 1] n , we construct a game with two groups of n players. The action set of all players is {0, 1 k , 2 k , . . . , 1} for k = λ+3 2ε . We denote by a = (
the vector that is played by the first/second group of players. The payoff function of player i in the first group is defined by
(1)
The payoff function of player i in the second group is defined by
where f i denotes the ith coordinate of the function f . Simply speaking, the first group is trying to match the vector of the second group, whereas the second group is trying to match the f operation on the vector of the first group.
Let (x, y) be a 3 4k 2 -WSNE of the game, where x = (x i ) n i=1 and y = (y i ) n i=1 are the mixed-action profiles of the players in the first and second groups.
The payoff of player i in the first group that faces the mixed strategy y of the second group can be written as
we assume that E(y i ) ≤ α i +0.5 k ; that is, E(y i ) is closer to α i k than to α i +1 k . By Equation (3), it is clear that α i k is a best reply of player i and his or her payoff at a best reply is at least
For every action γ k where γ = α i , α i + 1, player i's payoff is at most
Therefore, in a 3 4k 2 -WSNE, player i assigns positive probability only to the strategies α i k and α i +1 k . Following similar arguments for the second group of players, we write player's i payoff as
and we derive that player i assigns positive probability only to the strategies β i k and
For every approximate WSNE, we set c i = α i +0.5 k and d i = β i +0.5 k . We claim that the point c = (c i ) i∈ [n] is an approximate fixed point of f .
For every i, we have
This construction yields the following result. PROPOSITION 4.1. For every p > 0, n ≥ 1, λ ≥ 0, and ε ≥ 0, set k = λ+3
2ε . Then we have QC p WSN 2n, k + 1, 3 4k 2 ≥ QC p (AFP (n, λ, ε) ).
PROOF. Let F be the set of all λ-Lipschitz functions f : [0, 1] n → [0, 1] n . Let U be the set of games that correspond to F by the previously presented construction. Every WSN algorithm with success probability p on the set of games U induces an AFP algorithm with success probability p. The induced AFP algorithm will follow the WSN algorithm. Each query (a, b) will be mapped to the query f (a). Note that by Equations (1) and (2), f (a) is sufficient to get the answer for the payoff profile (u i , v i ). Therefore, the AFP algorithm can indeed follow the WSN algorithm. Finally, given a 3 4k 2 -WSNE, the algorithm can compute the values (α i ) i∈ [n] and find the approximate fixed point c = (c i ) of f .
Binary-Action
Games. The idea is to use a similar idea to those presented earlier (Section 4.1.1). Here, instead of 2n players with k + 1 actions for each player, we construct a game with 2n(k − 1) players with two actions for each player. In the previous reduction, the action set of each player i is {0, 1 k , 2 k , . . . , 1}. We replace every player i (in each one of the two groups) by k−1 agents (i, 1 k ), (i, 2 k ), . . . , (i, k−1 k ). The action set of agent (i, j k ) is A i, j := { j−1 k , j+1 k }. For simplicity of notations, it will be convenient to have two additional agents: agent (i, 0 k ) with single action A i,0 = { 1 k }, and agent (i, k k ) with single action 7 A i,k = { k−1 k }. When agent (i, j k ) plays a pure action (i, j±1 k ), we will say that agent (i, j k ) is pointing on agent (i, j±1 k ).
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For every i, given an action profile of the agents (i, j k ) k j=0 , the realized value of the ith agents is defined to be r i := c+0.5 k , where (c, c + 1) is the minimal pair of agents pointing on each other, in other words, the minimal c such that (i, c+1 k ) plays c k . Note that the realized value is well defined because the first agent 0 is always pointing on the second ( 1 k ), and the last agent 1 is always pointing on agent k−1 k . The payoff functions of the agents are defined similarly to the previous reduction (Section 4.1.1), but with respect to the realized values.
The payoff of agent (i, j k ) for a player i in the first group is defined by
where r i is the realized value of the i-agents in the second group. Similarly, the payoff of agent (i, j k ) for a player i in the second group is defined by
where r is the profile of the realized value of all agents in the first group. Every mixed-action profile of the agents in the second group y induces a distribution ρ on the realized values of the second group. The payoffs of agent (i, j k ) that is facing a mixed-action profile can be written as
Therefore, the difference in payoffs for the two possible actions of agent (i, j k ) is given by
In every 1 k 2 -WSNE, the mixed actions of the ith agents satisfy the following: (1) Every agent (i, j k ) such that j k < E(ρ i ) − 1 4k plays the action j+1 k with probability 1. This follows from Equation (6), because in such a case we have d i, j < − 1 k 2 , which implies that the action j+1 k is better than the action j+1 k by at least 1 k 2 . (2) Similarly, every agent (i, j k ) such that j k > E(ρ i ) + 1 4k plays the action j+1 k with probability 1.
Let c i be the closest integer multiple of 1
where [x] is the closest integer to x). By observation (1), we obtain that every agent (i, j k ) for j k < c i plays j+1 k . By observation (2), we obtain that every agent (i, j k ) for j k > c i plays j−1 k . Therefore, the realized value of the ith agents is either r i = c i − 0.5 or r i = c i + 0.5, and in any case |r i − E(ρ i )| ≤ 1 k . By repeating the same arguments for the second group of players, we obtain that in every 1 k 2 -WSNE, the realized value s i of the ith agents satisfies |s i − E r∼ω ( f i (r))| ≤ 1 k , where ω is the distribution of the realized value profiles for the first group.
Let (ω, ρ) be the distributions over the realized value profiles of both groups in an 1 k 2 -WSNE. Let (r, s) be a profile of realized values in the support of (ω, ρ). We claim that r is an approximate approximate fixed point of f :
This construction yields the following result. PROPOSITION 4.2. For every p > 0, n ≥ 1, λ ≥ 0, and ε ≥ 0, set k = 3+λ ε . Then we have (AFP (n, λ, ε) ).
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1.
From Approximate Fixed Point to End of Path
We denote by G(n, k) the graph of the n-dimensional grid of size k. The set of vertices of
. There is an edge between (c i ) n i=1 and (c i ) n i=1 if and only if c i = c i for all indexes i except for one index j for which |c j − c j | = 1. Note that G(n, 2) is the hypercube. A path on a graph will be called simple if it contains no cycles.
In this section, we prove a reduction from the approximate fixed-point problem AFP(n, 79, 1/88) to the end-of-a-simple-path problem:
ESP(n):
INPUT: Simple directed path on the n-dimensional hypercube (G(n, 2)) that starts at (1, 1, . . . , 1) .
OUTPUT: The end-of-path vertex. QUERIES: Each query is a vertex v of the hypercube. The answer is whether the path visits this vertex. If it does, then, in addition, the black box reports the path's previous and next visits.
The query complexity of an approximate fixed point has been studied by Hirsch et al. [1989] , where they show an exponential (in the dimension) lower bound. We cannot use the result of Hirsch et al. [1989] straightforwardly, because they consider deterministic settings, whereas we are interested in randomized settings. Nevertheless, we will rely on one part of their proof. Namely, we will use their reduction from the approximate fixed-point problem to the end-of-a-simple-path problem. The formal treatment of this reduction is quite involved; a 13-page proof of the reduction appears in Hirsch et al. [1989] . We present here only a brief intuition for the reduction and the result itself.
We divide the n-dimensional cube [0, 1] n into small cubes of edge size δ = (1/k). The small cubes with the neighboring relation form the graph G(n, k). Let us consider a specific example that explains the idea of the construction. Given a path on G(2, 3) with no cycles and with the starting point (1, 1), for example, the path presented in Figure 1 , we define a function f on small cubes of size δ = 1/4 as demonstrated in Figure 2 . By observing Figure 2 , the reader may be convinced that the function f has the following properties:
(1) f is Lipschitz continuous. This corresponds to the fact that the arrows are changed in a smooth manner.
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Y. Babichenko Fig. 1. A path in G(2, 3) . G(2, 3) . The rest of the squares are required to complete the definition of the function. The black dot denotes the unique exact fixed point of the function. Approximate fixed points are represented by short arrows.
(2) All the approximate fixed points of f are placed on the end-of-path square. This corresponds to the fact that all the arrows outside the top-right square have constant length; that is, f (x) is far from x for every x that is not in the top-right square.
(3) For every small square, f depends only on the following parameters of the path, namely, whether the path goes through this square, and if so, what the previous and the next visits of the path are. This corresponds to the locality property of the picture. If the path does not go through a square, then all the arrows in this square point downward. If the path goes though some square, it is enough to consider the previous and the next visits of the path in order to define f for this square.
In Hirsch et al. [1989] , they show that the construction of such a function f can be generalized to every grid size k and to every dimension n. In particular, they introduce a general construction that works for every approximation accuracy ε and every Lipschitz constant λ. For our purposes, it will be sufficient to focus on the case 8 ε = 1/88, λ = 79. For these values, the construction in Hirsch et al. [1989] states the following:
Given a simple path on G(n, 2) that starts at the point (1, 1, . . . , 1) and ends at the point (e i ) n i=1 for e i = 1, 2, we divide the cube [0, 1] n into small cubes with edge cube size 9 δ = 1/6. The vertex (v i ) n i=1 in the hypercube corresponds to the small cube × i [ 1+v i 6 , 2+v i 6 ] ⊂ [0, 1] n . By this correspondence, the hypercube is equivalent to all the small cubes that are contained in [2/6, 4/6] n . The starting point (1, 1, . . . , 1) is equivalent to the small cube [2/6, 3/6] n , and the end point corresponds to the small cube × i [ 1+e i 6 , 2+e i 6 ], which is denoted by E. Remark 4.3. Hirsch et al. [1989] construct a function f : [0, 1] n → [0, 1] n with the following properties:
(P1). f is 79-Lipschitz (Lemma 10 in Hirsch et al. [1989] ). (P2). || f (x) − x|| ∞ ≥ 1/88 for every x / ∈ E (Lemma 10 in Hirsch et al. [1989] ). (P3). The value of f on each small block in [2/6, 4/6] n depends only on the local behavior or the path in the corresponding vertex of the hypercube: whether the path goes through this vertex, and if so what the previous and the next visits of the path are (Lemma 11 in Hirsch et al. [1989] ).
This construction yields the following result:
PROPOSITION 4.4. QC p (AFP (n, 79, 1/88)) ≥ QC p (ESP(n)) for every n ≥ 1 and every 0 < p < 1.
PROOF. Let P be the set of all simple paths on the hypercube with starting point (1, 1, . . . , 1) . Let F be the corresponding set of functions f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] according to the construction of Hirsch et al. [1989] presented earlier.
Every AFP algorithm with success probability p on the set of functions F induces an ESP algorithm with success probability p. The induced ESP algorithm will follow the AFP algorithm. Each query x ∈ [2/6, 4/6] n will be mapped to a query of the corresponding vertex. For formal purposes, we should define also the map for queries x / ∈ [2/6, 4/6] n . Clearly those are meaningful queries because all the functions f ∈ F have the same values for x / ∈ [2/6, 4/6] n . For the sake of formality, we say that a query x / ∈ [2/6, 4/6] n corresponds to the query (1, 1, . . . , 1). By property (P3), the answer for the AFP query contains at least as much information as the answer in the ESP query.
Therefore, in the ESP model, it is indeed possible to follow the AFP algorithm. Finally, by property (P2), once the AFP algorithm finds a 1/88-fixed point, then the ESP algorithm finds the end of the path.
From End of Path to Hit the Path
In order to show that every randomized algorithm fails to find the end of the path, by the minmax theorem it is enough to show that there exists a distribution over paths such that every deterministic algorithm fails to find the end of the path. A similar analysis (in randomized settings) was recently conducted by Hart and Nisan [2013] , who showed that the end-of-(general)-path problem is hard. The difference between our problem and the problem in Hart and Nisan [2013] is that we assume that the path has no cycles, whereas in Hart and Nisan [2013] there is no such assumption. As we will see in this section, we can use similar arguments to derive a hardness result for our end-of-simple-path problem.
The idea in Hart and Nisan [2013] is that finding the end of a random walk on the hypercube of length 2 n/3 is hard. We cannot use directly the idea of a random path because the random walk has cycles with probability close to 1. Nevertheless, we can cut those cycles and get a simple path; this new path is no longer a random walk on the hypercube, but it does preserve the essential properties for the hardness result, as we will see later. Formally, given a random walk v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v 2 n/3 , the path after cutting the cycles is defined by the following iterative procedure: pick the minimal i such that there exists j > i where v i = v j . We pick the maximal j such that v i = v j , and we replace the existing path by v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v i , v j+1 , . . . , v 2 n/3 . Repeat this cutting process until no vertex appears twice in the path. We denote the resulting path without cycles by w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w L , where L is a random variable.
LEMMA 4.5. Let (v i ) 2 n/3 i=1 be a random walk on the n-dimensional hypercube. Then (v i ) contains no cycles of size greater than n 2 with probability of at least 1 − 2 · 2 −n/3 . PROOF. The mixing time of the random walk on the hypercube is known to be O(n log n) (see, e.g., Diaconis et al. [1990] ). This implies that for every pair of times i, j where i < j + n 2 , the probability of v i = v j is at most 2 · 2 −n . Therefore, summing over all such pairs of i, j (we have at most 2 2n/3 pairs), we get that the probability that at least one of these events will happen is at most 2 · 2 −n/3 . Now we proceed similarly to Hart and Nisan [2013] . In order to prove that there is no algorithm that finds w L with high probability, we define the following hit-thepath (HTP(n)) game between the algorithm and the adversary. The game is played for T = 2 n/3 /n 4 steps. The adversary chooses a path without cycles w 1 , . . . , w L . At each step 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the algorithm chooses a vertex q t when it observes the vertices revealed up to time t − 1: w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n 2 (t−1) , that is,
). The goal of the algorithm is to choose a future vertex, a vertex that is visited by the path n 2 steps later than the last revealed vertex (w n 2 (t−1) ), that is, q t = w i for i > tn 2 . After the algorithm chooses a vertex q t , the vertices w n 2 (t−1)+1 , w n 2 (t−1)+2 , . . . , w n 2 t are revealed to the algorithm. The algorithm wins if it has succeeded in choosing at least one future vertex. Otherwise, the adversary wins.
LEMMA 4.6. Using the mixed strategy w 1 , . . . , w L , which results from cutting the cycles of a random walk of size 2 n/3 , the adversary guarantees a win with probability of at least 1 − 3 · 2 −n/3 in the HTP(n) game.
PROOF.
Let v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v 2 n/3 be the random walk that induces the path w 1 , . . . , w L . For the bound analysis, we assume that if (v i ) has at least one cycle of size greater than n 2 , then the algorithm automatically wins. By Lemma 4.5, this yields a probability of at most 2 · 2 −n/3 for the algorithm winning.
In the remaining case, let us change the roles of the game HTP(n) in favor of the algorithm. First, we will provide to the algorithm more information at each step. Instead of revealing at each step n 2 sequential values of (w i ), we will reveal n 4 sequential values of (v i ). Note that n 4 sequential values of (v i ) contain at least n 2 values of (w i ) because (v i ) has no cycles of size greater than n 2 . Second, we will let the algorithm win not only if it hits a future vertex of (w i ) but also if it hits a future vertex of (v i ).
Using again the mixing time of the random walk argument (see Diaconis et al. [1990] ), we know that at each step the probability of hitting every future vertex v i is at most 2 · 2 −n . Summing over all future vertices and over all steps, we get that in the new game the probability that the algorithm will win is at most 2 · 2 −n 2 n 3 2 n 3 n 4 ≤ 2 − n 3 .
Summing this probability with the probability of automatic winning yields the result.
PROPOSITION 4.7. QC p (ESP(n)) ≥ 2 n/3 /n 4 for p = 3 · 2 −n/3 and for every n ≥ 1.
PROOF. As was mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, by the minmax theorem, it is enough to show that there exists a distribution over paths such that every deterministic algorithm that uses T = 2 n/3 /n 4 queries fails to find the end of the path with probability of at least p = 1 − 3 · 2 −n/3 .
Our random path will be w 1 , . . . , w L , as was described earlier. It is enough to show that every algorithm A E for ESP(n) with success probability p induces a strategy A H in the game HTP(n) with success probability p. The algorithm A H will just follow the algorithm A E . If up to time t the algorithm A H has not hit a future vertex of the path, then at time t the A H algorithm can calculate all the answers to the ESP(n) queries (because in the HTP settings it has at least as much information as in the HTP settings), and using those answers, it can produce the next query q t+1 . Therefore, it is indeed possible to follow the A E algorithm.
Finally, since the end of the path is a future vertex for all steps t, finding the end of the path will guarantee winning in the HTP(n) game.
Proof of the Main Theorems
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is obtained by joining the three reductions in Sections 4. (WSN(n, 3609, 2 −24 ) ).
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is obtained by joining the three reductions in Sections 4.1.2, 4.2, and 4.3. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2. By Propositions 4.7, 4.4, and 4.2, we get that for every n and p = 3 · 2 −n/3 holds 2 n/3 /n 4 ≤ QC p (ESP(n)) ≤ QC p (AFP (n, 79, 1/88)) ≤ QC p (WSN(7390n, 2, 3695 −2 ) ).
By replacing n with n 7390 , we have that for p = 3 · 2 −n/22170 holds 10 16 · 2 n/22170 n 4 ≥ QC p (WSN(n, 2, 3695 −2 )).
OPEN PROBLEMS
This article presents a fundamental result on the complexity of an approximate Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n, where every player has a constant number of actions m (or even just two actions). Even for these games, many questions still remain open.
(1) For an approximate (not well-supported) Nash equilibrium, this result yields an exponential lower bound of the query complexity, only for the case where the approximation term is ε = O(1/n) (Theorem 3.6). The case of an ε-Nash equilibrium for constant ε remains open. What is the query complexity of an ε-Nash equilibrium for constant ε? (2) The result provides an exponential lower bound for a constant but tiny approximation term, (ε = 1 2 10 −7 ). It will be interesting to improve the exponential lower bound for bigger values of ε. What is the query complexity of the problems WSN(n, m, ε) for 9 0 ε < 1/2 and for constant m? (3) As mentioned in the Introduction, from the computational complexity perspective, our results prove the impossibility of a poly(n) algorithm (or equivalently poly(log N), where N = nm n is the size of the game) for approximate Nash equilibrium in the case where the game is given explicitly by specifying the payoffs of all players in all action profiles. 10 This consequence follows from counting the number of times that the algorithms will have to access the input. To the best of our knowledge, even the poly(N) algorithm is not known in such a case. The Lipton et al. [2003] sampling method provides an algorithm for computing an ε-Nash equilibrium with running time poly(N log N ). Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [2008] prove the existence of the poly(N log log N ) algorithm. Babichenko et al. [2014] prove the existence of the poly(N log log log N ) algorithm. Is there an algorithm that computes an ε-Nash equilibrium in poly(N) steps? (4) As mentioned in Section 3.5, the query complexity protocol is a special case of communication complexity protocol; that is, the communication complexity lower bound induces a query complexity lower bound, but not vice versa. We want to emphasize that the communication complexity of an approximate (well-supported or not) Nash equilibrium remains an open question.
Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria 36:21 APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.6. We start with the following modification of Lemma 4.28 in Daskalakis et al. [2009] on the construction of approximate WSNE from approximate NE. Let x = x i be a (ε 2 /(16n))-Nash equilibrium. For every player i, we classify the actions of player i into three groups, according to the outcome of this action against x −i (G i good actions, M i medium actions, and B i bad actions).
We fix some g * i ∈ G i , and we let y i be any mixed action that moves all the probability mass from B i to g * i , and in addition moves some probability mass from M i to g * i (in any possible way). Formally, y i (B i ) = 0, y i (m i ) ≤ x i (m i ) for every m i ∈ M i , y i (g i ) = x i (g i ) for every g i ∈ G i g i = g * i , and finally y i (g * i ) is defined so that the total measure of y i is 1. Now we claim that every such profile (y i ) n i=1 is an ε-WSNE. First, let us note that x i (M i ∪ B i ) ≤ ε/(4n), because otherwise, only the losses from playing the actions in M i ∪ B i will be higher than (ε 2 /(16n)). Therefore, the distance in total variation from x i to y i is at most ε/(4n).
Second, let us note that if every opponent of player i changes his or her mixed strategy with probability of at most ε/(4n), then the payoff of player i may change by at most (n − 1)ε/(4n) < ε/4 (we recall that the payoffs are bounded in [0, 1]).
Finally, every action that is played by y i with positive probability is an ε/2-best reply to x −i . Therefore, it is an ε-best reply to y −i , because the best reply may increase by at most ε/4, whereas the performance of each action may decrease by at most ε/4. Now, if we fix the threshold for classifying good and bad actions to be br i − 3ε/8, and we receive answers about u i (a i , x −i ) with precision ε/8, then indeed all the good actions will be classified to G i , and all the bad actions will be classified to B i . It will make no difference to us where the actions in M i are classified. Now we are able to prove the reduction from an ANE algorithm to a WSN algorithm. We show that every ANE(n, 2, ε 2 /(16n)) algorithm that uses T − 64n 2 /εn 2 queries and has success probability p+ 2 −n induces an WSN(n, 2, ε) algorithm that uses T samples and has success probability p. The WSN algorithm follows the ANE algorithm to find a (ε 2 /(16n))-Nash equilibrium. Then it evaluates the numbers u i (a i , x −i ) using 32n/ε 2 samples (the total number of samples will be 2n 32n ε 2 ). By the Hoeffding inequality, the probability that all the samples will approximate the values u i (a i , x −i ) with precision of ε/8 is at least 1 − 4ne −n > 1 − 2 −n . Then the algorithm will use the previous procedure with the threshold br i − 3 · 10 −8 /8. If the ANE algorithm indeed finds a (ε 2 /(16n))-Nash equilibrium, and the samples indeed ε/8-approximate all the values u i (a i , x −i ) that accrue with probability of at least p, then the induced WSN algorithm has succeeded in finding ε-WSNE.
For a constant ε, we get from Theorem 3.2 that every ANE(n, 2, ε 2 /(16n)) algorithm that uses 2 (n) −64n 2 /ε 2 = 2 (n) queries has success probability of at most 2 − (n) +2 −n = 2 − (n) . In order to complete the proof, we observe that 2 (n) = 2 ( ε 2 16 n) ≤ QC p ANE ε 2 16 n, 2, 1 n ≤ QC p ANE n, 2, 1 n .
